Since the events of 11 September 2001, terrorism 
Introduction
Despite political violence being an historically omnipresent phenomenon, some would argue that the events of 9/11 have arguably reconfigured the meaning of terrorism in the West, and rendered it more powerful, shadowy and dangerous (see Beck 2002b; Kellner 2002 ). The 'new terrorism'-as dubbed by government and security expertshas seeped into political language and public discourse, intensifying the feeling that we are living in risky times. Following this lead, several academics have suggested that new forms of terrorism have become a leitmotif of the age. In this oeuvre, Ulrich Beck (2002a) speaks of a 'terroristic world risk society', while Borradori (2003) refers to living in 'a time of terror'. Yet, exactly what is it that is 'new' about new terrorism, and what kinds of theories might best equip criminology to address these issues?
Of course, some criminologists might argue that terrorism is not a legitimate criminological concern and thereby would contest the need to engage with debates around 'new terrorism'. Such an argument refracts the contemporary criminological preoccupation with 'crimes of everyday life'. This is evidenced in a number of different ways. As an example, we might consider the work of Garland (2001) and its articulation of the criminological relationship with what he has called the 'culture of control'. Whilst there is clearly a debate to be had on the accuracy of the narrative that Garland offers in relation to criminology (see, e.g. the critique offered by Braithwaite 2003; Young 2003a; Walklate 2005) , it is nevertheless the case that what was referred to as 'administrative criminology' in the 1980s has persisted in occupying a central position on the criminological stage. Indeed, it could be argued that the extended variant of this version of criminology has never had so much influence as it does contemporarily (see Young 2003b). The reasons for this, and the continued marginalization of more critical criminological concerns, are multifaceted.
1 However, a cursory review of the recent content of criminological journals reveals that whilst emotions, war, cultural criminology and the question of how criminal justice policies travel feature as 'special issues', little coherent attention has been paid to the question of terrorism which may, in part be a result of the dominance of the 'criminology of everyday life' (though it should be noted that McEvoy and Ellison (2003) offer a sound review of the various criminological discourses on terrorism in Northern Ireland). Nevertheless, part of our understanding of, and reaction to, terrorism lies is its link with what is considered legal or illegal, whether such an understanding be constructed nationally or internationally. Moreover, we can certainly learn something about changing definitions and notions of what counts as crime, the criminal, the victim and 'fear', if current concerns around 'new terrorism' are given a more prominent position within the discipline of criminology. The purpose of this paper, then, is to create such a criminological agenda through a reconsideration of the relative value of both the risk-society and governmentality theses. In other words, following Jock Young's (2003b) advice, we are striving to reconnect criminology to sociology. This is not to say that much criminological work has not been influenced by the theses identified above. Indeed, quite the contrary. Rather, the purpose here is to consider the value of establishing a wider-ranging, more inclusive and problematic agenda for criminological thought as a result of a fuller embrace of the value these theses and their value in understanding the composition of 'new terrorism'.
To be clear, the theoretical subtleties and nuances of governmentality and risk-society theories are not the focal issue here. Given the sprawling corpus available, coverage of both perspectives is necessarily incomplete. However, what is intended in opening up the debates about the value of these theoretical routes into terrorism is a toolkit approach, focusing on what can and cannot be said from within these camps. The central purpose of the paper is to demonstrate how competing theories of risk can be fruitfully employed to illuminate dominant understandings of terrorism, contemporary political and military responses to terrorism and the formation of law and order policies. Thus, the spirit of the paper is one of adventure, rather than empirical precision; of raising problematic theoretical questions, laying bare contradictions in policy and flagging up residual ambiguities that require investigation. Underlying this exploratory method is a fundamental belief that criminological theory should enable us to offer up accounts of the causes and effects of political violence, whether it be enacted by state or non-state actors. This adventure-if we can be so bold-falls into four parts. In the first, we define our terms of reference. In the second, we offer an appraisal of the two theses we wish to explore. In the third, we apply an understanding of these two theses to 'new terrorism' and, in the fourth, we offer ways of developing this understanding for criminology.
Part One: Terms of Reference
It should be noted from the outset that defining 'terrorism' is a sticky activity (see Chomsky 2001; Hoeksema and ter Laak 2003; Lacquer 1999) . In so far as certain crimes-such as burglary-are relatively easy to determine, terrorism is much more difficult to classify in criminological terms (Furedi 2005) . In many cases, it is not so much the specific mode of violence as the underlying motivation that may lead to a crime being categorized as terrorism (Jenkins 2003) .
Despite these inherent complexities, terrorism is generally understood to be the use of violence and intimidation to disrupt or coerce a government and/or an identifiable community. Terrorism has traditionally been distinguished from routine criminal violence because it is driven by a particular political and/or religious motivation. Terrorist acts are commonly directed against civilian targets and populations, with the intention of creating insecurity and injury (Rehn 2003: 55; Wilson 2003) . Whilst we can agree on some of the key components of terrorism, it is important to recognize that the attachment or designation of the label 'terrorist' is also a moral and subjective judgment: one person's 'terrorist' is another person's 'freedom fighter' (Lodge 1988: 2; Wardlaw 1989: 5) . Furthermore, movement between these poles can occur over time, as demonstrated by cultural and political shifts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo. There are also many different styles of terrorism that are driven by different motivations, undertaken by different actors and have different targets. Moreover, it must be noted that a full discussion of terrorism needs to give due consideration to the role of the state in terrorist activities (see Furedi 2005: 309; Gearty 2002) .
Like terrorism, risk is a notoriously slippery concept. In everyday parlance, risk is used to indicate the possibility of danger or harm (Lupton 1999a: 8) . Theoretically speaking, risk is constituted by three major properties: probability, uncertainty and futurity (Mythen 2004: 13) . Traditionally, statistical and technical methods have been used to anticipate the probability of various harms materializing, from adverse weather warnings to car accidents (Loader and Sparks 2002) . Probability calculations generated by risk assessment provide numerical estimates through which harm can be gauged. When experts assess risk, they are usually attempting to predict future outcomes based on past performance (Giddens 1998: 27) . Therefore, risk relates to forecasting and preparing for possible eventualities (Ewald 1991: 207; Sparks 2001: 160) . However, although probability assessments can offer best guesses about risk impacts, in many instances, the actual manifestation of harm remains unpredictable and uncertain. As Adam and van Loon (2000: 2) note, the power of risk does not reside in the fact that it is happening, more that it might be happening.
2 Irrefutably, there has been growing interest in risk over the last two decades within the mass media, politics and culture more broadly (Furedi 2002: 7; McGuigan 1999) . In academic circles, risk has emerged as a major topic of concern within criminology, with governmentality and risk-society perspectives being at the vanguard (see Garland 1997; Hudson 2003; Stenson and Sullivan 2003; Rigakos and Hadden 2001) .
3 Concomitantly, despite being traditionally seen as the stomping ground of those involved in military and defence studies, since the events of 9/11, the social sciences have belatedly declared an interest in terrorism (Beck 2002a; Goh 2004) . In recent times, a number of authors have argued that a new form of terrorism has emerged (see Lacquer 2000; Lesser et al. 1999; Morgan 2004 ). This 'new terrorism'-typified by the actions of extreme Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al Qaeda-is said to be distinct from the forms of terrorism practised by traditional terrorist organizations such as ETA and the IRA (see Morgan 2004; 9/11 Commission Report 2004) . As opposed to operating locally with united ideological objectives and strict hierarchies, new terrorist groups are defined by their amorphous aims, disparate organization and capacity to strike across different continents (see Lesser et al. 1999 ). Rather than being locally self-financed, 'new terrorism' is funded by a diverse range of sympathetic sources around the globe, including private financiers, charities and nongovernmental organizations (9/11 Commission Report 2004: 57) . What is more, as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated, new terrorist groups are willing to launch 'spectacular highlethality' acts which directly target civilians (see Lesser et al. 1999: 42; Hoffman 1999: 9) . In the United Kingdom, academic discussions about 'new terrorism' have focused on a cluster of interlinked issues, including the level of current threat, possible modes of attack, the robustness of emergency management procedures and the efficacy of counter-terrorist measures. Of course, it is easy to see why terrorism has become a fundamental political concern in Western capitalist cultures. Terrorist acts disrobe the liberal myth that the state is capable of providing order and control over its territory (Garland 1996: 448) . Such is the current state of anxiety; the British Prime Minister has gone as far as stating that the threat of new terrorism is comparable with that presented by Nazism in the mid-twentieth century (Waugh 2004: 5) . In both the United Kingdom and the United States, a spiralling amount of public funds have been allocated to counter-terror measures. In the United Kingdom, spending on homeland security is set to grow from £1 billion to £2.1 billion between 2004 and 2008. Prior to 9/11, the amount spent per annum on national security was £950 million. In the United States, the resource allocation for the Department of Homelands Security for the year 2005 is a staggering $40.2 billion. By implication, the perspective of this paper is drawn from observations and experiences from within this Anglo-American axis. The question remains, though, as to what sense criminology has made of this level of anxiety and what kind of theoretical toolkit will help make best sense of current and future developments.
It has to be said that there is a strong tradition of criminological work that would justifiably challenge the newness of 'new terrorism'. From the work of Quinney (1972) to more contemporary critical criminological concern with the question of harm done, criminologists have argued that what is to be understood as crime, a victim of crime and/or criminal is broad in its scope and includes an understanding of responses to and the work of what might be considered to be the coercive and/or the terroristic state, as suggested above. In the United Kingdom, this kind of criminology has included a focal concern with the activities of the IRA. Moreover, such concerns and anxieties were never purely academic if one considers, for example, the events in Manchester in 1996. So it is a moot, though not unimportant, point as to whether or not current experiences and concerns with 'new terrorism' are best understood as extensions of longer-running issues rather than a product of new ones. Moreover, it has arguably only been through the pre-existence of legal and other responses to these longer-running issues that the state has managed to extend its control so easily (see Biglino 2002; Innes 2001) .
Part Two: Criminology, Risk Society and Governmentality
Recent criminological work of a critical nature that has embraced a concern with risk more generally, as opposed to terrorism in particular, has sought to extract elements of Beck's work, rather than adhering to the risk-society thesis in its primary form (see Hudson 2003; Stenson and Sullivan 2003) . Although the criminal justice system is a fundamental site where the principles of risk are applied, Beck himself has shown scant interest in criminological issues, preferring to scrutinize the influence of risk in other cultural domains. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that there remains a degree of confusion within criminology about what precisely risk-society theory is and how it might profitably be exercised (O'Malley 2001: 87) . Whilst Beck sidesteps criminological debates, various components of his thesis have been fruitfully extracted to explore issues of penal control, policing and social justice (Feeley and Simon 1995; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Hudson 2003) . In a similar vein, the work of Foucault has generated significant interest within criminology-leading some to herald the evolution of a fresh theoretical language within the discipline (Culpitt 1999; Pasquino 1991) . This language has enabled criminology to explore the ever more subtle and diverse use of power of and by the state and-whilst not concerned with risk per se-has provided a means by which risk can be understood as an extension of regulation. In the following sections, we elucidate some of the central tenets of the risk-society and governmentality theses before considering the value of each in understanding the composition and regulation of 'new terrorism'.
The risk-society thesis
The risk-society thesis traces the connections between macro-social transformations and the rising cultural prevalence of risk. Progenitor Ulrich Beck contends that qualitative changes in the nature of risk, coupled with the loosening of institutional structures, have reformulated social relations in Western cultures. For Beck, the transference from an institutionally ordered industrial society into the individualized whirlwind of the risk society initiates two critical problems. First, the large-scale production of manufactured risks creates adverse consequences across a range of social spheres, including the economy, security, politics and the environment. Secondly, the proliferation of an everyday culture of risk places burdensome demands upon the self, forcing individuals to habitually make reflexive choices (Hudson 2003: 44) . 4 Beck believes that pre-industrial cultures were predominantly blighted by 'natural hazards', such as earthquakes, floods and famine. In the transition into industrial society, the power of natural disasters is lessened through institutional intervention. However, the process of capitalist modernization has itself produced a series of volatile manufactured risks. The force of these 'side-effects' of techno-economic development signals a movement from a regimented industrial society to an unplanned and chaotic risk society.
Beck supports his historical claims with reference to three pillars of risk (see Mythen 2004: 17) . First, the toxicity of contemporary hazards is said to imbue risk with greater temporal and spatial mobility. In comparison to the temporally compact hazards arising in pre-industrial cultures, in the risk society, threats cannot be delimited. Environmental pollution, human cloning and bioterrorism are sui generis, defying temporal or geographical enclosure. Thus, localized risks common to industrial society have been supplanted by the de-territorialized dangers of the risk society. As the global reach of terrorism demonstrates, 'national security is, in the borderless age of risks, no longer national security' (Beck 2002b: 14) . Secondly, risks have come to possess greater potential for harm in the modern age. Not only do manufactured risks span the globe, they also generate irremediable effects. Beck (2002b: 9) reasons that the acceleration of techno-scientific development has intensified, not reduced, risk production: ' . . . the risks of terrorism exponentially multiply with technological advancement. With the technologies of the future-genetic engineering, nanotechnology and robotics, we are opening a new Pandora's box.' Thirdly, the destructive energy of manufactured risks shatters existing principles of insurance. In industrial society, hazards are predicted and managed through insurance policies, welfare practices and legal constraints. By contrast, in the risk society, the ferocious force of 'worst imaginable accidents' (WIAs) disempowers existing methods of institutional regulation. These radical transformations in the nature of risk engender fundamental transformations in the nature of politics and patterns of social distribution. In industrial society, the general public pressed political parties to ensure adequate distribution of 'goods', such as income, health and housing. Conversely, in the post-needs risk society, individuals become preoccupied by protection against social 'bads', such as pollution, crime and terrorism. Since nobody craves ownership of bads, the logic of the risk society is no longer based on possession, but avoidance:
The dream of class society is that everyone wants and ought to have a share of the pie. The utopia of the risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning . . . the driving force in the class society can be summarised in the phrase 'I am hungry!' The driving force in the class society can be summarised in the phrase 'I am afraid!'. (Beck 1992: 49) This ground shift is suggestive of a wider point about social distribution. While the logic of the class society is sectoral-some win and some lose-the logic of the risk society is universal: ultimately, everyone loses. In a perverse way, the universality of global threats is serving to democratize the distribution of risk. On a perceptual plain, this is indicative of a movement away from differential class-consciousness toward a universal risk-consciousness. In essence, the foremost threats of the world risk society-ecological conflicts, financial crises and global terror networks-remain constant across space and place.
The governmentality thesis
Alongside Beck's realist approach, the social constructionist perspective advanced by Michel Foucault has generated significant ripples within criminology. Despite current academic usage, Foucault did not put purposely put risk at the heart of his project. Nonetheless, over the last two decades, the central planks of his governmentality thesis have been broadened to accommodate the ways in which risk is being thought out and mobilized in Anglophone countries. Foucault believed that in earlier periods of civilization, power was routinely expressed through the direct will of sovereign monarchs. In contrast, in contemporary Western cultures, power filtrates through the matrix of governance. For Foucault, governmentality-as both a set of organized practices and a guiding rationale-has been a feature of political power since the eighteenth century.
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In rudimentary terms, governmentality is about the segmentation of life into various institutional fields-family, economy, education, hospitals, prisons-which are bound by forms of governance (Foucault 1991a: 96) . State institutions seek to achieve order and promote discipline through neo-liberal values and customs that combine to constitute bodies of social knowledge. In practice, governance functions through a mix of direct expressions of power and indirect forms of coercion. In so far as the state retains the legitimate right to use force, direct expressions of violence are rarely necessary. More precisely, it is political rationalities (techne) which order and regulate patterns of social behaviour.
But how does all this relate to risk? From a Foucauldian point of view, risk is operationalized as a mode of regulation, through which populations are surveyed (Lupton 1999a: 87; Rose 2000) . Hence, acolytes of Foucault have attempted to elucidate how neo-liberal states discipline and govern through risk. In particular, populations are ordered through statistical forms of categorization which constitute a 'science of the state' (Foucault 1991a: 96) . The aggregate management of populations through actuarial techniques is seen as a fundamental form of power. Across time, expert knowledge produced within economics, science, medicine and psychology has marked out the boundaries of risk. Accordingly, there has been a swing away from the individualized category of dangerousness towards the collectivized logic of risk. Through institutional manoeuvring, various modes of profiling and assessment have de-subjectivized notions of threat and transformed risk into an objective, actuarial concept. In this way, risk is more a 'calculative rationality' than a material entity (Castel 1991; Dean 1999) . Rather than being utilized as a tool for monitoring disparate individuals, risk works as a 'moral technology', regimenting and cajoling populations. Through the implementation of disciplinary practices-e.g. criminal sentencing, police surveillance and health insurance-risk provides a way of organizing time/space and ordering the future (Ewald 1991: 207) .
Foucauldians argue that neo-liberal institutions have sought to 'activate' individuals by making them answerable for the risks and uncertainties that crop up in everyday life. Citizens have become 'multiply responsibilized' around the management of financial security, employment, crime and welfare (see Dean 1997) . Instead of being bought into line by the direct force of the state, individuals are encouraged to become selfpolicing. In this way, the art of government is performed through risk-based techniques which are more oblique and benign than expressions of power in previous epochs. Building on Foucault's work, Simon (1997) and Ewald (1991) agree that regulatory forms of control that work through self-restraint have fortified institutional power. As self-evident 'truths' cluster into discursive regimes which direct behaviour, people become practised in bringing themselves to order (Allen 2004: 39) . Thus, governmentality equates to a 'specific economy of power-in which societies are ordered in a decentred way and wherein society's members play a particularly active role in their own self governance' (Dupont and Pearce 2001: 125) . Having provided a capsule account of risk-society and governmentality perspectives, we now turn to the potentialities of each thesis for making criminological sense of 'new terrorism'.
Part Three: Reading 'New Terrorism': Buddying Up with Beck
It is evident that the global dimensions of the risk-society perspective dovetail neatly with current conceptualizations of new forms of terrorism. Since 9/11, the public have become accustomed to reminders that a new type of risk has emerged. Dominant political narratives emphasize that new terrorism knows no geographical boundaries. In the words of the British Prime Minister, 'we have got to be totally vigilant in the face of the threat because all major countries around the world face the same threat'. 6 The geographical mapping of the terrorist threat nestles up against Beck's claims about the universality of manufactured risks. Whilst the distribution of accidents in industrial society chases hierarchical class structures, the terrorist risk can be charted as following a circular motion, which transcends established patterns of affluence and poverty. In the final analysis, insuring against exposure to terrorism is impossible, even-if not especially-for those with cultural and economic clout. As Beck (1996: 32) puts it, 'there are no bystanders anymore'. In its mobility and permanence, the threat of 'new terrorism' stretches the boundaries of time and space. Al Qaeda is thought to have terrorist cells in over 90 countries across the globe, affording it the potential to strike anywhere, at any time (Barnaby 2003: 131) .
7 Indeed, this global presence is reflected in the geography of the groups' cross-continental attacks. Trailing the risk-society thesis, we can also pick out the futuristic quality of the new terrorism. The battle against emergent forms of terrorism is institutionally cast as a conflict of the present and the future. In this 'new war', we may only be at the 'beginning of the end of the first phase'.
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Taking the second pillar of risk-the catastrophic nature of consequences-the modes of attack open to terrorist groups can neatly be written into the risk-society narrative. Any number of cataclysmic possibilities abound, including radiological dispersal devices, biological and chemical attacks and/or air strikes against nuclear facilities.
9 In the event of such incidents occurring, the loss of human life and damage to infrastructure would doubtless surpass the losses of 9/11. As Beck (2002a: 46) dramatically cautions, 'the theory of world risk society is not just another kind of "end-of-history" idea: this time world history does not end with the resolution of political and social tensions, as Marx and Fukuyama believed, but with the end of the world itself'. Yet, contra Beck, we would maintain that such a meta-narrative of global bads needs to be empirically scrutinized, not unthinkingly accepted. As the recent miscommunication of Iraq's WMD 'capability' in the United Kingdom and the United States demonstrates, a propensity to believe the worst-case scenario amongst political elites can lead to hasty militarism and ruinous consequences. Although the spectre of WIAs predictably induces anxiety, it is debatable whether catastrophic events are more likely to happen today than in bygone eras (Furedi 2002) . In spite of the cultural fixation with terrorism, we need to keep hold of the fact that danger is an omnipresent phenomenon.
10 Individuals may feel justly anxious about the terrorist threat, but this does not mean to say that 6 Extract from the Prime Minister's address to the Annual Labour Party Conference, March 2004 , cited in Waugh (2004 . 7 It should be noted that the constitution of both al Qaeda and its weapons capability have been the subject of considerable debate in recent times. 8 Taken from Tony Blair's speech to Sedgefield Constituency, 5 March 2004, reproduced in The Independent, 6 March 2004. 9 Despite much vaunted fears of biochemical attacks and cyberterrorism, up to going to press the methods used by al Qaeda have been relatively crude.
10 Amidst rumours about the perilous possibilities of high-tech weaponry, we should remember that the blunt force of simple warfare claimed over 100 million lives in the twentieth century (Eagleton 2001: 15). they are more or less prone to attack than in previous eras. Throughout the prolonged period of 'heightened alert', we need to remember that new terrorism remains a highconsequence, low-probability risk. Once we make the distinction between risk as possibility and risk as harm, the universalizing language of the risk-society narrative comes unstuck. This said, there are certainly elements of a 'boomerang effect' in the way in which terrorist groups are turning techno-scientific advances against their creators. The dubious fruits of of neo-liberal globalization are being skilfully harnessed by terrorist groups through activities such as phishing, money laundering, tax evasion and identity theft (Sassen 2002: 235) . Mobile phones-a motif of capitalism-were used to detonate incendiary devices in the Madrid train bombings. Further, it is possible that scientific skills honed in Western universities are being used to manufacture sophisticated bombs and chemical nerve agents like Sarin and Tabun.
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Thirdly, it is reasonable to argue that 'new terrorism' cannot be insured against. The creation of generalized danger is a strategic terrorist objective, directed through the targeting of areas of routine civilian use. Going to work, using public transport and shopping are humdrum features of everyday life. Short of living underground, it is hard to see how one could adequately insure against victimization. Due to uncertainty about the nature and location of future attacks, it would be very difficult to perform a dependable risk assessment. The unpredictable topography of terrorism evades the span of regulatory institutions, forcing governments to concede that they cannot guarantee public safety. Although Beck is right that traditional methods of calculating risk are blown out of the sky by terrorist activities, governmentalitists remind us that the resultant vacuum can just as easily extend as threaten the powers of dominant institutions. The very impossibility of estimating the terrorist risk has enabled political elites to circulate decidedly fanciful claims to justify state violence.
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On reflection, it may well be that Beck overstates the extraordinariness of terrorism and overplays the reforming effect of manufactured risks on institutional systems of regulation. As Stenson (2003: 25) reasons, 'generalised characterization of the "risk society" involves perhaps an unduly selective focus on some features of modern life . . . there is now a widely shared criminological view that the new lexicon of risk has downplayed older conservative and classical liberal concerns with justice as retribution or just desserts'. It may well be that law and order institutions in the United Kingdom and the United States are responding to the current threat through a clumsy combination of hands-up admission and forceful retaliation, meaning that manufactured risks may not be reconfiguring social relations in quite the way Beck imagines. Pace Beck, it is certainly true that bads-such as terrorism, environmental despoliation and BSE-have captured the attention of politicians and the media in recent years, raising public sensitivity to risk.
13 At the level of political rhetoric, we can detect 'a command to "think security" instead of full employment, public education or the good society' (de Lint and Virta 2004: 466) . Similarly, in terms of political policy, there has been a discernible 11 Azahari bin Husin, a suspected bomb maker for the radical Islamic group, Jemaah Islamiyah, is a British-trained engineer and former university lecturer. 12 The most obvious being the claim that Saddam Hussein could assemble and dispatch chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes. On tending his resignation, David Kay, the head of the Iraq Survey Group, opined that weapons of mass destruction had never been developed in Iraq. 13 In statistical terms, the UK has been safer over the last ten years than at any point in the last four decades until 7 July 2005. The last significant terrorist attack on the mainland came in 1996, when the IRA detonated a bomb in a shopping area in Manchester. shift in the last 20 years from issues of economic inequality toward concerns about risk (see Culpitt 1999; Ericson and Carriere 1994: 102) . Nonetheless, at an underlying structural level, it is improbable that the unsafe society has supplanted the unequal society. The correlation between class and risk remains tight, with those least able to acquire the goods being most adversely affected by bads (Scott 2000) . In so far as greater attention is being paid to social bads, the distribution of goods remains strikingly uneven (Mackintosh and Mooney 2004) . Regardless of changing political and media inflections, risks are sprinkled over existing class cleavages (Engel and Strasser 1998: 95; Hall and Winlow 2003: 155) . Along with Rigakos and Hadden (2001: 73) , we would agree that contemporary society is as much-or as little-about class as it has ever been. Resisting the universal bent of the risk-society thesis, what counts as risk is culturally relative. As Wole Soyinka (2004) points out, the downing of a passenger plane by terrorists in Niger some months before the Lockerbie disaster received scant attention in the West: 'even in death, where all victims are surely considered equal, some continue to die more equally than others. Dying over Scotland, no matter what your pedigree, enhances your value over dying over African soil. ' In critique, we would also contest that the risk-society approach is too sanguine about the transformatory quality of risk and overplays the political prospects which pop out of manufactured risks such as terrorism. Inasmuch as Beck hankers after the moulding of states into transnational cooperative networks, current international relations within the United Nations do not inspire hope that this is a probable outcome. Unfortunately, the prevailing reaction to the new terrorism in liberal democracies has not been one of dialogue and reconciliation, but punishment and retribution. Far from being imbued with the spirit of cosmopolitanism, the political vocabulary of risk has become more gutteral, typified by messianic pronouncements about the 'Armageddon' sought by 'evildoers' in 'rogue states'. As has been historically documented, government-sponsored moral panics often result in the formation of legislation that restricts civil liberties and curtails freedom of expression (see Cohen 1972; Welch 2003 ). Yet, there is little space in the risk-society argument for the invidious punitive measures being sanctioned in the United Kingdom and the United States, at the level of both domestic and foreign policy:
Although the risk society/new penology paradigm may be able to account for the apparent increasing predominance of risk assessment in criminal justice, and of risk avoidance measures in our daily individual and collective life, it cannot, at first glance, throw much light on the turn that seems to have taken place from justice to vengeance, from due process to gloves-off crime control. (Hudson 2003: 45) Far from a global politics of risk which emphasizes responsibility and equality, what is emerging instead, it seems, is a politics of fear and vengeance.
Part Four: Governing Terrorism, Following Foucault
By way of qualification, it has been noted that the patterns recounted by Foucault are more comfortably described theoretically than they are evidenced empirically (Allen 2004: 39; Dupont and Pearce 2001: 150) . This said, we might assuage any lingering hesitancy by remembering that Foucault himself invited micro applications of his metatheory (see Culpitt 1999: 33). Here, we relate the governmentality thesis to countermeasures against the new terrorism, the discursive construction of a terrorist other and the extension of a culture of surveillance and control. It is clear that neo-liberal agencies of crime control are employing risk-based techniques to assess the level of terrorist threat and to make future projections of danger. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, security services have utilized predictive databases and intelligencegathering to inform safety assessments.
14 The airing of colour-coded security symbols serves as a neat example of the filtering through of risk-management strategies to the general public. 15 In addition, there appears to be something of a return to regulatory mechanisms of control through which 'risky' classes are surveyed. As a matter of course, intelligence agencies can be expected to collect data and information about terrorist groups. 16 Yet, we can also discern how the classification of suspected terrorists fits within a wider net, cast to identify offenders by risk values rather than addressing them as rational social actors (Hudson 2003: 42) . A 'new penology' concerned with the control of risk as opposed to the moral state of the offender or his/her rehabilitation is being stitched together in Britain and America (qua Feeley and Simon 1995) . Further, new strategies of risk management-e.g. preventative detention, the introduction of penalties for association with wrong-doers and satellite tracking-are suggestive of a deterministic attempt to develop methods of 'pre-crime' control. Beside the modes of risk assessment that can be identified using a Foucauldian perspective, there has been a move towards more direct methods of controlling the terrorist risk. In America, the 9/11 attacks initiated a sharp jolt to the right in terms of public attitudes to law and order, hastening calls for tighter domestic security. At the level of criminal justice policy, this has been reflected in a pendulum shift from risk management to risk control. The use of managerial techniques to reduce risk to acceptable levels has been overwritten by more forceful methods intended to eliminate future threats through direct action. As Steinert (2003: 281) observes, the unabashedly aggressive foreign policies adopted by President Bush stand as a case in point: ' . . . the attack on the World Trade Center is seen in analogy to a schoolboys' masculinity contest: if I don't hit back, he will see that I'm a coward and will do it again.' The political drift towards authoritarian populism has cut into the calculus of risk and extended crime models based on punishment and retribution.
It is also evident that understandings of terrorism are being discursively shaped by the agencies involved in risk definition. Forms of knowledge are being manufactured and circulated by an institutional matrix, involving the state, politicians, security experts and the media. In the United Kingdom, the public articulation of a series of 'near-misses' is symptomatic of an intertwining narrative of terrorist threat. Various terrorist plots have allegedly been foiled, including an aircraft attack on Canary Wharf Tower, explosive strikes on the Houses of Parliament and the detonation of a bomb at Old Trafford football stadium. Of course, this is not to suggest that the terrorist threat is fictional-merely that it is being fictionalized. As Tudor (2003: 253) detects, interconnected expressions of fear carry greater weight than those which appear in isolation. The recurrent hot potato of the 'terrorist scare', passed from politicians to the public via the mass media, is unlikely to lessen public anxiety, nor to induce opposition to the hardening of domestic security. The dissemination of dominant discourses of terrorism can function as a tactic of disciplinary control through which right-thinking citizens are encouraged to come to order and adhere to governmental objectives.
Following Rose (2000) , there are perhaps two co-existent modes of risk management: those that regulate within an inclusionary zone and those that seek to work on pathologies through tactics of exclusion. As Said (1978) posits, those deemed to be outside dominant social groupings are routinely classified as 'other'. The institutional representation of the terrorist as ultra-deviant and inhumane serves as a clear example of the discursive construction of a monstrous other (Hudson 2003: 204) . In times of heightened threat, 'not me-other' forms of representation and reasoning tend to flourish:
While the other is defined in terms of difference and inferiority in relation to normative values in an ongoing sense, the representations that arise at times of crisis intensify this distinction. They reflect a very powerful division between a decorous, righteous 'us' and a disruptive, transgressive 'them'. (Joffe 1999: 23) Looked at under the unforgiving microscope of the 'war on terror', entire countries are being accorded pariah status and labelled aberrant. One need look no further than the infamous 'axis of evil' constituted by a collection of 'outlaw regimes' for confirmation of a deliberate strategy of exclusion through discourse. What is more, the 'axis of evil' is a decidedly stretchy construct, which can be grown and shrunk to fit. 17 For its elocutors, the employment of disciplinary language has produced desired effects. Since the issuing of an open threat of pre-emptive strikes, Iran has demurred to US requests to allow weapons inspectors back into the country. As Kellner (2002: 25) reasons, the battle between liberal states and terrorism is being set up as 'the defining struggle of the era, coded as an apocalyptic battle between good and evil'.
Regrettably, the 'war against terror' is providing a multi-purpose rationale for a variety of authoritarian measures, including punitive restrictions against asylum seekers, illegal detention and unwarranted forms of surveillance. The hasty introduction of repressive legislation, granted under the 2000 Terrorism Act and the 2001 British AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act, has weakened, not enhanced, democracy (see Barnaby 2003: 7; Biglino 2002) . Further, the UK government has recently launched the 2005 Anti Terrorism Bill, which proposes home-custody orders, juryless anti-terror trials, permission to use wire tap evidence in court and civil orders for parties suspected of 'acts preparatory to terrorism' (see Morris 2004b ). Post 9/11, rigid immigration barriers have been erected in many territories in Europe and North America (Sassen 2002: 241; Welch 2003: 5) . In so far as stringent policing of borders may be a plausible response to security fears, the concern is that certain populations-explicitly those from the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa-are classified as dangerous. Few would rally against improving procedures for identifying terrorists, but, in the indiscriminate trawl, 'suspect populations' are being dreamt up, marginalized and put under suspicion. The point at issue here is not so much about the risk itself, but who or what risk gets attached to (see Dean 1999: 131) . The new techniques of counter-terrorism do not seem to be based around reliable quantitative judgments about the probabilities of offending. Instead, they deal in aggregate characteristics, such as birthplace, skin colour and religion. The unpalatable upshot is that many ethnic minority groups are finding themselves marginalized and incriminated. In the United Kingdom, the number of Asian people stopped and searched under anti-terrorism laws quadrupled in a single year, from 744 in 2001-02 to 2,989 in 2002-03 (Morris 2004a) . Meanwhile, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have identified 11 'countries of concern', whose citizens' applications to work are referred for government approval if they fall within 'high-risk' areas. In the United States, extensive profiling of Muslims of Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi and Moroccan heritage has been sanctioned, with thousands of people being summoned to report to Federal offices for fingerprinting (Fiske 2003: 18) .
Through the governmentality lens, we can see how the construction of a suspect population is making 'subjects' of certain civilians on the basis of possession of an ascribed set of ethnic, religious and cultural traits. Unwittingly, innocent people are rendered risk repositories by virtue of sharing some or other of the characteristics of the 'typical' terrorist. As with the well documented cases of violence and torture meted out by US soldiers in Iraq, the overzealous use of detention can also be traced back to preconceptions about the mendacious other:
The charges against most of the people detained in the prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan are non existent-the International Committee of the Red Cross reports that seventy to ninety percent of those being held seem to have committed no crime other than simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time, caught up in the sweep of 'suspects'. (Sontag 2004: 6) Alongside the introduction of authoritarian domestic controls, at a wider level, what is materializing at present is a power play of disciplinary force, administered through Anglo-American foreign policy. Borrowing Foucauldian phraseology, a fair amount of sovereign power is simultaneously being expressed, from waging war against 'oppressive regimes' to the illegal physical detention of 'enemy combatants' (see also de Lint and Virta 2004: 466) . 18 In the United States, the much maligned Patriot Act gifts the US administration virtual carte blanche where law and order is concerned. Within a year of 9/11, hundreds of people were arrested and incarcerated in the United States under the auspices of the Patriot Act, without formal charges, possibility of application for bail or the prospect of a trial (Kellner 2002: 32) . The US government is yet to charge any of the 1,200 citizens of Middle Eastern descent detained in the direct aftermath of 9/11 with charges related to terrorism (Welch 2003: 6) . The all-embracing tentacles of the Patriot Act are indicative of the blend of direct force and ductile discipline administered under the catch-all banner of the 'war on terror', permitting the tapping of electronic and wireless communication, the arrest of individuals without charges and the staging of secret military trials (Kellner 2002: 32) . 19 The governmentality thesis gives voice to the possibility that interest groups are able to use their strategic capabilities to capitalize on unforeseen events. At the very least, the UK and US governments appear to have used the mantra of 9/11 to carve out economic and cultural inroads. For those of a critical disposition, the war on terrorism is acting as a pretext for the expansion of Western neo-imperialism (Chomsky 1989; Sontag 2004) . In keeping with Foucauldian logic, terrorism is providing a political lexicon through which ulterior motives are being camouflaged and hidden agendas executed.
We can see, then, how the construction of overriding institutional discourses makes risk thinkable through the implementation of multiplex forms of governance. Following this argument, the discourse of terrorism is determining what is (un)sayable and (un)doable about risk. Those in any way opposed to the violent reprisals in Afghanistan and Iraq are dismissed as unpatriotic altermondistes, in need of direction back to the trump card of 9/11. Rather than simply reflecting reality, expert knowledge is being stranded together through the articulation of political ideals, legal policies and 'defence' strategy. Along these boulevards, various truths about terrorism are being walked and trained up into governmental savoirs. Such savoirs are steadily saturating the public sphere, strained through economic decisions, political rhetoric and media representations:
The culture of terrorism that has grown in our midst is a structure of considerable power, with an impressive arsenal of devices to protect itself from the threat of understanding and with a powerful base in the institutions that dominate every facet of social life-the economy and political institutions, the intellectual culture and much of popular culture as well. (Chomsky 1989: 256) Thus, we can use the governmentality approach to uncover the dynamics of knowledge/power and to reveal how discourses of risk are mobilized to justify instrumental political goals. Through the Foucauldian looking glass, counter-terrorist measures designed to combat new terrorism have led to the intensification of a surveillance culture. The $200 'Total Awareness Programme' launched in the United States permits government agencies to open personal emails, screen internet activity and collect data on citizens' movements and activities. Beneath external forms of observation, the gaze of surveillance has also been turned inwards. In post-9/11 America, the public have been urged to remain alert and these exhortations have been formalized through extending the capabilities of neighbourhood watches to include the reporting of possible terrorist activities (Hoeksema and ter Laak 2003: 98) . Such attempts to activate citizens normalize the practice of surveillance and reshuffle power relations: ' . . . the aim is no longer to place the individual under the "eye of power" in order to exercise individualizing forms of surveillance; rather surveillance is "designed in" to the flows of everyday existence' (Rose 1999: 234) . In taking up the appeal to internalize the 'gaze of surveillance', individuals are encouraged to become inured in their watching (Culpitt 1999: 147) . In tandem, the Terrorist Information and Prevention System (TIPS) has liquified state responsibility, inviting citizens to become unpaid security guards, spies and informants. Putting aside the moral issues, the potential for abuse is palpable. It is easy to see how ill-thought-out counter-terrorist measures can blur the line between vigilance and paranoia.
What is clear in both countries is that governmental policies have distanced themselves from fundamental principles of human rights and gravitated toward policies that accept a zero-sum approach that the rights of some can be forfeited to defend those of others (Hudson 2003: 65) . Concurring with Garland (2001) , governmentality can help us visualize the formation of a 'crime complex', through which economic, political and cultural interests are coalescing. The new powers cobbled together under the auspices of post-9/11 national security have generated an intensified degree of governance through which populations are classified and controlled. Striking a chord with the governmentality argument, current anti-terrorist policy is constituted by a blend of soft coercion and direct control. On the one hand, citizens are encouraged to concur with prevailing discourses of terrorism by accepting official estimations of threat, remaining watchful and supporting pre-emptive strikes against would-be aggressors. On the other, practices of governance are increasingly marked by repressive force deemed permissible in response to 'novel' and 'unprecedented' security conditions. We can see, then, that the application of Foucauldian concepts enables us to get a decent handle on the social construction of the terrorist risk, the coercive tendencies of the state and the extension of institutional methods of control.
Yet, it is also worth briefly dredging up some of the limitations that arise when we follow Foucault. Unfortunately, the governmentality thesis presents a universal subject, which does not allow us to properly differentiate between the motivations and proclivities of different individuals/groups. Additionally, questions have been raised about the totalizing force of discourses and the degree of compliance implied in the governmentality thesis. The danger is that individuals are portrayed as insentient 'docile bodies', observing and obeying disciplinary discourses (Shilling 1997) . Whilst the possibility that mentalities of rule and practices of governance can be challenged, the cultural and biographical features which may encourage such resistance are not sufficiently delineated. This is an important rejoinder, given that understandings of the terrorist risk will be influenced by cultural factors such as religion, ethnicity, gender and region. Perception and experience of risk cannot but be mediated by individual biography as well as dominant institutional discourses (Hollway and Jefferson 2000: 18) . Accordingly, the topic of 'new terrorism' can logically be expected to produce diverse and contradictory opinions amongst different stakeholders. To this end, greater attention needs to be paid to the means by which subjects make sense of discursive strategies and the way in which these hermeneutic fibres feed into the warp and weft of everyday life.
Part Five: Shifting the Criminological Ground
In applying the risk-society perspective to the dilemmas around new terrorism, we have travelled some distance. The pillars of risk which prop up Beck's argument can be shaped to fit with various facets of the terrorist threat, from the globalization of danger to the unmanageability of after-effects. Beck's 'terroristic world risk society' provides us with a dystopic vision of the future, through which we can glimpse a drift into violent counter-modern conflicts between the state and terrorist groups. In this respect, the risk-society perspective serves as both a timely political wake-up call and a harbinger for the future. Nonetheless, we have also stumbled across several slips and gaps in the risksociety narrative which limit its utility. In particular, the conflation of risk and uncertainty weakens the purchase of Beck's thesis, leading him to entertain unrealistic ideas about the redistribution of social problems.
Supporting Foucault, we can see how discourses of risk construct a terrorist other, promoting the unwarranted attachment of blame and invoking intensified strategies of surveillance. Now, as in previous eras, risk is being wielded as an instrument of disciplinary power through which populations are governed. It is probable that the discourse of new terrorism has permitted dominant political powers to pursue a weighty military agenda whilst deflecting political opposition against state violence. To twist Simon's (1997) memorable phrase, we might say that neo-liberal states are seeking to 'govern through terrorism'. Whilst the Foucauldian critique can enrich debates about the governance of terrorism, it is more limited in its appreciation of the day-to-day negotiations through which people make sense of risk. Of course, the risk-society thesis and the governmentality perspective are macro-theories which, by design, present a universal risk subject (Lupton 1999b: 6) . As a result, the structuring role of stratification and the power of cultural identities in influencing understandings of risk are conspicuous by their absence. Needless to say, the chalk and cheese presentation may have served to exaggerate the space between each perspective. Nevertheless, although the paths trodden by risk-society and governmentality approaches signpost avenues into the debate about terrorism, neither approach is singularly satisfactory in grasping the juddering relationship between risk, regulation and politics. Put simply, Foucault over-eggs the power of social structures and unduly mutes human agency, whilst Beck underplays the coercive capacity of social structures and romanticizes the political possibilities of risk conflicts.
Having considered the ways in which governmentality and risk-society perspectives can illumine various aspects of the terrorist problem, we wish to end by offering up some reflections on the use value of our theories of risk for criminology and the formation of a research agenda. It is evident that a degree of theoretical camp sitting has led to something of a critical impasse on the relative merits of each of these positions. Many Foucauldians have resolutely upheld a position as relativist as the risk society is realist. In effect, the two camps have pitched up either side of the river of risk. To infuse future debates with due vim, greater appreciation of the positive facets of each paradigm is required, together with a willingness to labour at the interface. Furthermore, inasmuch as criminologists should justly struggle to relate theoretical models to everyday lived reality, the desire for researchable sense should not obstruct the evolution of theory. As Foucault (1991b: 81) advises, 'the fact that this real life isn't the same thing as the theoreticians' schemas doesn't entail that these schemas are therefore utopian, imaginary'.
Our expedition into the social construction of 'new terrorism' has left us with many issues that have only been partially addressed. A propos the risk-society thesis, it is evident that we need to search for more sensitive and reflexive institutional methods of engaging with terrorism. There is also the prescient matter of how techno-scientific development can be regulated to prevent the dissemination of ambiguous technologies, be they nuclear, chemical, biological or genetic. More pressingly, we might wonder whether and how enduring issues of inequality can be properly factored into the burgeoning politics of risk. With Foucault in mind, by delving into the triadic relationship between knowledge, power and risk, we have come across thorny issues around the uses and abuses of the terrorist problem. Is the construction of a generic discourse of the non-white terrorist other causing unwarranted global tensions? Are authoritarian counter-terrorist measures being used to reinforce unequal power relations? To what extent is the hegemonic discourse of terrorism serving to extend the economic, political and cultural pincers of Western nations?
There are also bigger questions at play around the stability of international relations and the future of global security. In our opinion, the 9/11 back draft should be leading criminologists to rethink the relationship between democracy, security and social justice (see also de Lint and Virta 2004; Welch 2003) . Nationally, a dominant discourse of security around new terrorism is increasingly shaping public policy in the United States and the United Kingdom. It is clear that we are living in a haphazard and labile world, yet it is critical that we pause long enough to think through the root causes of terrorism, not simply the ways in which perpetrators can be punished. To borrow Beckian terminology, the complexities inherent in the word 'and' are presently being distilled down to the 'either-or' of state violence (O'Tuathail 1999: 11) . In the final analysis, it may well be that the most dangerous consequence of increased activity by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda is the escalation of violence between state and non-state actors. As death and bloodshed become customary features of the daily media diet, the conflicts of interest and culture clashes that seed violence should not be seen as somehow beyond the radar of academic influence. Whilst it may be easier to opt out of the thorny questions raised above, it is important that we pursue meaningful solutions to the recent drift into xenophobia, aggression and brutality. As Young (2003b) has argued, to retain a critical edge, it is essential that criminology continues the Mannheimian tradition of exploring 'dangerous thoughts'-of thinking through and behind the contemporary criminological scene towards a fuller understanding of the concepts it has come to adopt. To this end, we need to remain vigilant, not just about the terrorist risk, but also about forms of control which unjustly vilify and criminalize law-abiding communities and the extent to which current legislation may or may not serve to facilitate this. In tracking the governance of security, the security of governance must not be allowed to rest outside the ambit of the criminological imagination.
